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INTRODUCTION

The trading nations of the world are set to make decisions that will
determine the future pattern of international trade. Negotiations are currently underway to bring trade in certain agricultural products, services,
and goods and services protected as intellectual property" within the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 This Article will
* Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration
of Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.
** Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives.
The views expressed in this Article are personal and do no represent the views of the
Committee or any other member of the Committee.
1. As used in this Article, the term "intellectual property" includes copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and mask work protection. Due to space constraints, this
article focuses on patents and copyrights.
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. As of the end of 1988 the GATT had
93 contracting parties. See generally J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
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outline how the consideration of intellectual property came to be included in this round of talks. It will assess the potential benefits and
risks of including intellectual property, forecast the probable outcome,
and, finally, suggest ways to improve the chances for inclusion of intellectual property into the GATT. The Article also stresses the congressional role in these negotiations and offers criteria for evaluating the success of the negotiations.
II.

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Intellectual property protection for goods and services has become increasingly important to United States business in recent years. In the
postwar era, the relative percentage of United States exports with a high
intellectual property content (for example, chemicals, books, movies,
records, electrical equipment, and computers) has more than doubled to
more than twenty-five percent of all United States exports.' Royalties
received by United States industries from the licensing of intellectual
property exceeds $8 billion per year, which is more than six times the
amount paid to foreign firms.' Equally significant are the losses that occur when such goods and services are pirated. According to some estimates, the value of lost sales due to unauthorized copying of United
States products throughout the world exceeds $40 billion per year." The
increasing importance attached to trade-oriented intellectual property,
growing levels of piracy facilitated by emerging technologies, and expanding research and development costs has motivated businesses to seek
governmental intervention to protect their intellectual property rights.'
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

396-432 (1986); J. JACKSON,

WORLD TRADE

AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).

3. R. Oman, Register of Copyrights of the United States, Speech entitled Prentice
Hall Keynote Address, Prentice Hall Symposium 4 (Oct. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Oman
Prentice Hall].
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 3 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 54-59
(March 1988) (Table 10).
5.

U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTEL-

App.
H, at H3 (1988) [hereinafter ITC REPORT].
According to the Register of Copyrights, the problem is not limited to developing
countries. A recent study of the intellectual property problems of seven industrialized
countries revealed that pirate copies of United States books, radio, and video works, computer products, and pharmaceutical products exceeded two billion dollars. Oman Prentice Hall, supra note 3, at 6.
6. See ITC REPORT, supra note 5, at 5-1; Hoffman, Marcou, & Murray, Commercial Piracy of Intellectual Property, 5(11) COMPUTER LAW. 7 (1988).
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE,
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The most comprehensive initiatives yet undertaken have been certain
congressional efforts to improve United States intellectual property law.'
Parallel to these initiatives has been the effort to include intellectual
property standards, norms, and enforcement minimums as a code beneath the GATT umbrella.
Following several years of effort by the business community, intellectual property negotiations were included as a part of the Ministerial
Declaration on the Uruguay Round of GATT talks.8 The United States
has provided governmental leadership on this issue, and the private sector in the United States, Europe, and Japan supports these efforts.
International recognition of the connection between intellectual property and the world of international trade is a relatively new phenome7. See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 35 U.S.C.);
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (codified in
scattered sections of 18, 19, 28 U.S.C.); Trademark Clarification of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-18, 18 U.S.C. § 2311, 2300));
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1295, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2182, 2457, scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Pub. L. No.
100-159, 101 Stat. 899 (1987) (semiconductor chip protection act extension) (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100568, 102 Stat. 2853; Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102
Stat. 3935; Generic Animal Drug Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-670,
102 Stat. 3971 (1988).
8. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, SUMMARY OF THE PHASE II RECOM-

MENDATIONS (1986); See generally J. GORLIN, A TRADE-BASED APPROACH FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL
STALSON,

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND U.S.

TIVENESS IN TRADE

A NEW MTN:

(1985); H.
COMPETI-

(1987);

UNITED STATES COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS,
PRIORITIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1985); R. BENKO, PRO-

(1987).
Note, Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT United States Goals in the Uruguay Round, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (1988); Dam, The Growing Importance
of InternationalProtection of Intellectual Property, 21 INT'L LAW. 627 (1987); Simon,
Trade Linkage Reemergence, CONTEMP. COPYRIGHT & PROPRIETARY RTS. ISSUES 307
(1987); Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section Reviews Recent Developments,
32 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 473 (Aug. 28, 1986) (remarks of Emory
Simon director of the Office of USTR concerning the merger of trade and intellectual
property in 1984); Stokes, Intellectual Piracy Captures the Attention of the President
and Congress, NAT'L J., 443 (1986) (outlining the political impetus behind various legislative changes); Mossinghoff, The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection in
InternationalTrade, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235 (1984). See also Intellectual
Property and Trade: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) [hereinafter Kastenmeier Hearings].
TECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES
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non.' This linkage began in a publicly evident manner during the 98th
Congress with the enactment of a series of measures requiring the Reagan Administration to examine the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the
intellectual property laws of our trading partners, as a part of the trade
assessment process.' 0 This largely bilateral approach assumed that the

9. There are some early examples of connecting trade and intellectual property protection, but the prominence of this linkage has emerged more recently. The French and
Belgian Governments signed an agreement in the 19th century that required the Belgians
to stop their printers from copying the works of French authors. Oman, Trade and
Copyright: The Trade and Copyright "Interface" and the Enhancement of Copyright

Protection Through Trade Initiatives, reprinted in, 1 ALBANY

LAW SCHOOL ANNUAL

CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GLOBAL COMPETITION: THE ROLE OF

8-7 (1988) [hereinafter Oman Albany].
According to some observers, the initial exposure of some private sector companies to
the linkage between intellectual property and trade occurred in the late 1970s when they
sought governmental assistance in responding to the piracy of patent rights in the chemical context by various Hungarian concerns. A limited amount of bilateral negotiations on
various intellectual property issues began in 1981.
Private sector interests discovered that there was a paucity of tools to respond in a
flexible and measured way to the intellectual property related problems they were confronting overseas. Partially as a result of this awareness, some private sector groups began to advocate the inclusion of intellectual property based trade sanctions in public
reports. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETITION, THE NEW REALITY (1985).
10. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE 1985 REPORT at
222-37.
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67; § 212(b)(5), 97
Stat. 369, 384-87 (1983), 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(9), 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.191-.198, conditions
the benefits of Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) on an Executive Branch finding that
governmental organizations not engage in "poaching" and rebroadcasting of broadcast
signals. The CBI also permits the, President to review theft of signals by private parties
and the extent to which the applicant country provides "adequate and effective means for
foreign nationals to secure, exercise and enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property..
. ." Id. § 212(c)(9), (10). This measure was initiated primarily for the benefit of the
movie industry to counteract theft of movies from satellites, although it also assists publishers in the enforcement of their rights. Oversight on International Copyrights, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, TO
SECURE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WORLD COMMERCE (1984); Note, Signal Piracy: The Theft of United States Satellite Signals, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 62
(1984).
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-573, §§ 503, 505, 98 Stat. 2948, 301923; (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462(c)(5), 2464(c)(3)(B)(ii)), delegated authority to the
President to take into account a nation's laws and practices to protect adequately intellectual property rights as a condition of receiving the trade benefits offered by the Generalized System of Preferences Program (GSP). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1984).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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United States could obtain significant changes in the intellectual property
laws of other countries through the threat/negotiation process. For some
American business interests, the results of this initiative were necessarily
under-inclusive.' Moreover, because the potential impact of such a technique on some of the United States trading partners was limited, American businesses began to advocate the use of the GATT forum for en-

Examples of countries that receive GSP benefits but also allegedly fail to protect intellectual property adequately include: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Egypt, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, [Indonesia, South Korea], Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Sri Lanka, [Taiwan], Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 227 n. 40 (1986)
[hereinafter OTA Report] (the countries in brackets were identified by the OTA, but
have lost all or part of their GSP benefits since 1986 for unrelated reasons). In January,
1989 Thailand lost part of its GSP benefits, in part, as a result of inadequate copyright
protection. Farnsworth, U.S. Curbs Thai Goods, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1989, at bl, col.

6; Editor, Thailand Denied Certain GSP Benefits for Weak IntellectualProperty Laws,
37

PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 279 (1989).
Section 304 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948,
3002-06 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(e)(3)(C), 2411(e)(4)(B)), clarified that section
301 of the Trade Act applies to the denial of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights. See generally S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983);
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 146-47 (1984).
In 1988 Congress enacted the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-84, 1211-16, sections 1301-1480, and 1341-42, 19
U.S.C. §§ 2411, 1337. These amendments require the United States Trade Representative to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the intellectual property protection offered
by our trading partners on an annual basis and to take appropriate action. See generally
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 579-80 (1988), 600. The use of
mandatory self-initiated section 301 actions has the net effect of elevating the importance
of intellectual property issues in the trade context.
It is interesting to note that the terminology used in these trade laws requires the
United States to measure whether another nation's laws are "adequate and effective."
These identical terms are used in article I of the Universal Copyright Convention. A
drawback to this terminology in the context of the Universal Copyright Convention is
vagueness. The terms permit a nation to adopt either a high level or minimum level of
copyright protection. How to Protect the Nation's Creativity by Protecting the Value of

Intellectual Property: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1984)
(testimony of David Ladd, Register of Copyrights).
11. For a description of the successful use of section 301 to secure changes in the
intellectual property laws of Korea, Note, A Trade-Based Response to Intellectual

Piracy: A Comprehensive Plan to Aid the Motion Picture Industry, 76 GEo. L.J. 417,
446-47, 458-59, 487-88 (1987) [hereinafter Trade-Based Responses]; KastenmeierHearings, supra note 8, (testimony of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyright Office).
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hanced intellectual property protection. 1 2 Some advocates of the GATT
process also saw it as complementary to the bilateral process. They argued that GATT standards could be applied to bilateral negotiations.
Alternatively, some advocates of the GATT initiative viewed it as a useful device for energizing the other United Nations organizations responsible for intellectual property matters.
Genuinely disenchanted with the existing multilateral intellectual
property fora (the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
and UNESCO), and the absence of enforceable minimum standards
within existing multilateral intellectual property treaties,"3 The United
States private sector considered using the GATT as a vehicle for improving the level of international multilateral standards. 4 Members of the
United States business community whose products rely on intellectual
property protection-and their Congressional allies-urged the United
States Government to attempt to include intellectual property protection
in the then-forthcoming round of GATT talks.1 5
The United States promoted its position to the other GATT contracting parties. This effort succeeded in producing the Punta del Este
Declaration, which outlines the negotiating goals for the round:
In order to reduce the distortations and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify
GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit

12. The use of bilateral mechanism has limitations of several varieties. For example,
a trading partner may not have enough trade with the United States at risk to concern
itself with a bilateral threat. Other countries may be deemed too important to national
security to be targeted for retaliation on an intellectual property issue.
13. Oman PrenticeHall, supra note 3, at 11; HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 8.
14. M. GADBAW, T. RICHARDS, S. BENZ, L. KENNY, R. GWYNN, & J. MACLAUGHLIN, PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION

2-2, 2-3 (1987). Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Law Section Reviews Recent Developments, 32 PAT. TRADEMARI" & COPYRIGHT J.
IN SEVEN DEVELOPING NATIONS

(BNA) 473 (Aug. 28, 1986). Oman Albany, supra note 9, at 8-9 (discussing the absence

of adequate patent protection for pharmaceutical products).
15. A possible basis protecting intellectual property within the GATT would be
through the use of article XXIII, which provides that when a country uses forbidden
measures that injure the trade of a second country, the latter may assert that its benefits
had been nullified or impaired and retaliate. Oman PrenticeHall, supra note 3, at 2930.
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goods, taking into account work already undertaken in the GATT.
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other complementary
initiatives that may be taken in the World Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to deal with these matters.1 6
The envisioned GATT agreement would contain four basic elements:
(1) substantive standards for intellectual property protection; (2) effective
enforcement measures at the border and internally; (3) a multilateral
consultation and dispute settlement mechanism; and (4) traditional
GATT provisions, including transparency and national treatment applied to intellectual property. Creating norms and standards for intellectual property would be the most important and difficult area. During the
two years of the current round of talks, representatives of the contracting
parties have met in Geneva and informally at other locations to develop
a set of norms or standards."7 The United States, the European Community, and Japan have each submitted proposed standards."8 In addition,

the United States proposal includes provisions concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.19 To date, the principal OECD
countries2" have failed to reach an agreement on substantive standards or

16.

Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral

Trade Negotiations, September, 1986, at 7-8, reprintedin Bradley, Intellectual Property

Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 95 (1987), and [3 July-Dec.] INT'L TRADE REP. 1150
(Sept. 24, 1986).
17. For example, a group of like-minded nations (including the United States, the
European Community, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, and other countries) met in Washington, D.C., in March 1988 to discuss intellectual property standards. The same group
met in Geneva, Switzerland in June 1988 to discuss enforcement measures.
18. Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objective, MTN.
GNB/NG1 1/W/14/Rev. 1 (October 17, 1988); United States Submission to the Negoti-

ating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, United States (undated) (on file with authors) [hereinafter

US Submission]; United States Position on Standards and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, United States, (undated).

Guidelines and Objectives Proposed by the European Communityfor the Negotiations
on Trade-Related Aspects of Substantive Standards of Intellectual Property Rights,
CoMM. EUR., MTN.GNG/NG 11/W/26 (July 7, 1988); GREEN PAPER ON COPYRIGHTS AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGY-COPYRIGHT IssuEs REQUIRING IMME-

AcTION, COMM. EUR. (June 7, 1988). See also Proposal by Switzerland,
MTN.GNG/NG 11/W/25 (June 29, 1988). Submission by Japan, MTN.GNG/NG
ll/W/17/Add. 1 (September 23, 1988).
19. US Submission, supra note 18.
20. These countries consist of the European Community, Japan, Canada, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United
States.
DIATE
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enforcement mechanisms. More significantly, the developing countries
2
have shown no willingness to engage in serious negotiations. '
A December 1988 meeting in Montreal, Canada reviewed the progress made thus far in the Uruguay Round with respect to intellectual
property. Four distinct positions emerged, without any signs of reconciliation between them. The United States, the European Community, and
Japan were united in their willingness to negotiate substantive standards. The countries comprising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 22 were willing to continue the discussions, but argued
that the end product should reflect the developmental differences of the
Third World, Canada, and Switzerland, whose intellectual property
laws are generally adequate, but who wish to see the standard-setting
exercise include as many GATT signatory or contracting parties as possible, appeared more willing to enter into negotiations even if they produced lower intellectual property standards. The fourth approach, articulated by the Indian and Brazilian delegations, was shared by several
developing countries, including some Latin American nations. This
group questioned the nature and scope of the Punta del Este Mandate
and sought to have intellectual property standards set by WIPO, if at all.
These nations apparently have concluded that WIPO would be a more
sympathetic forum for the preservation of their existing intellectual
property laws. Therefore, they insisted on studying topics that would
lead to the diminution of intellectual property protection, such as compulsory licensing. In sum, the developing nations' view was largely antithetical to the view articulated by the negotiators from the United States,
the European Community, and Japan.23

21. Third World countries have argued that WIPO not the GAIT, should be the
standard setting entity for intellectual property. EC and Japan Present Intellectual
PropertyProposalsfor Uruguay Round Negotiations, [4 July-Dec.] INT'L TRADE REP.
1499 (Dec. 2, 1987). The Brazilian paper put forward for discussion at Montreal suggested that WIPO, UNESCO, and UNCTAD were the only competent organizations
within the United Nations system to set substantive intellectual property standards. This
approach would have the net effect of nullifying the Uruguay Round on intellectual
property issues because the decision-making process within WIPO (which requires de
facto approval of any initiatives by the developing countries) would preclude any improved intellectual property standards with respect to copyright or patent protection in
the short term. See generally Farnsworth, Brazil and India Fight New Copyright Rules,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1988, at D2, col. 5; Stokes, Trading on U.S. Cohesion in Montreal,
NAT'L

J., 3201 (1988).

22. These countries are Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Singapore.
23. The European and Japanese delegations reportedly urged the Midterm Review
Declaration to include significant-albeit subtle-changes in the text of a Ministerial
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III.

THE URUGUAY ROUND OF

GATT

NEGOTIATIONS

A. PotentialBenefits to Intellectual Property Owners
The current round of talks in the GATT negotiating process promises
an internationally accepted and enforceable set of intellectual property
norms and standards. This goal is of paramount interest to the many
members of Congress who have advocated intellectual property reform,
both domestically and internationally. Viewed optimistically, the GATT
negotiations could avoid some of the more obvious problems that have
occurred within the standard-setting and enforcement efforts within treaties administered by WIPO.2" From the perspective of the United States
Declaration to reflect the continued opposition to sections 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
and section 337 of the Tariffs Act of 1930. The concern about section 337 was not
surprising given the active participation by these Contracting Parties in a pending
GATT panel on the legality of section 337. See generally General Agreement on Tariff
and Trade, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (the case name for the
GATT complaint). Gilston, GATT Report May Challenge U.S. Unfair Trade Rules, 8
WASHINGTON TARIFF AND TRADE LETTER 1 (Dec. 5, 1988); P. Montagon, GATT

Panel Finds US Unfair on Patents, Fin. Times, Dec. 7, 1988, at 7. According to press
reports, the GATT panel has concluded that section 337 of the Tariff Act is incompatible with the GATT. Nelson, GATT Panel Says U.S. TariffLaw is Unfair to Importers,
Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1989, at All, col. 3. Before a panel decision has any effect, however,
it must be approved by the GATT Council. Under the present GATT dispute resolution
rules, any Contracting Party, including the United States, can block the adoption of this
panel report.
The concern about section 301 is not as transparent. These two parties apparently fear
the use of any bilateral trade retaliation regardless of the subject matter. Alternatively,
they could have been genuinely concerned about the possible section 301 actions that may
be taken against them to improve their intellectual property laws. For example, Japan
may wish to foreclose complaints about its record rental laws, its discriminatory patent
enforcement mechanisms or other non-tariff trade barriers to importation and sale of
goods protected by intellectual property. But see Oman Albany, supra note 9, at 8-10
(expressing doubt about whether the lack of a strong Japanese record rental law would
produce a section 301 complaint).
24. The most significant deficiency in the WIPO process is the absence of a meaningful system for the enforcement of minimum standards of intellectual property protection. Oman Albany, supra note 9, at 8-3, 8-10 to 8-12. There is also a widespread
impression among the leaders of the business community that the WIPO has been a
sympathetic forum for the articulation of some anti-intellectual property activity. Revision of the Paris Convention on IndustrialProperty: Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the AdministrationofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (Comm. No. 23 Print 1982); see generally World Intellectual Property Organization, May 3, 1988 (relating the status of certain WIPO initiatives concerning the
development of intellectual property standards). The authors do not necessarily share this
view, but rather report this conclusion as a widespread perception within the United
States.
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business community, 2 5 the standards ideally would accomplish the
following:
(1) Adoption of the Berne Convention 26 as the copyright norm, with
two major clarifications: with additional copyright protection for (a)
computer software and databases, and (b) sound recordings. 7
(2) Adoption of a patent law minimum well above the requirements of
the Paris Convention, 28 this would involve the patenting of virtually all
subject matter, including pharmaceutical products, chemicals, pesticides,
and plants, (especially products of modern biotechnology). This standard
would also provide for a patent term of at least twenty years from
29
filing.
(3) Adoption of adequate trademark protection.
(4) Adoption of adequate trade secret protection.
(5) Adoption of the forthcoming WIPO treaty on semiconductor chips
30
as the minimum standard for protection of mask works.

It remains unclear whether the chances for agreement within the GATT will be
greater than within WIPO. Some observers believe that changing the forum will not
alter the attitudes of the governments involved in the negotiations.
25. See generally Statement of the Views of the European, Japanese and United
States Business Communities (June 1988) [hereinafter Basic Framework]; Basic Framework of a GATT Arrangement on Intellectual Property (Dec. 18, 1986). Intellectual
Property Committee, (The committee is composed of Bristol-Myers Company, E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, FMC Corporation, General Electric Company, General Motors Corporation, Hewlett-Packard Company, International Business Machines
Corporation, Johnson and Johnson, Merck & Co., Inc., Warner Communication, and
Monsanto, Pfizer, Inc., Rockwell International Corporation.).
26. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 reprinted in 7 COPYRIGHT 135 (1971).
For a discussion of the United States Adherence to the Berne Convention, see generally Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988); 134 CONG. REC. H. 10091-98 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988); 134 CONG. REC.
S.14544-67 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988); H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988);
S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1987, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.
(1988).
27. See Oman Prentice Hall, supra note 3, at 13-9 (discussing data base treatment
under the Berne Convention).
28. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, T.I.A.S. 603, 828 U.N.T.S.
305.
29. US Submission, supra note 18.
30. Report Adopted by the Committee of Experts on Intellectual Property in Respect
of Integrated Circuits at its Fourth Session, WIPO Doc. No. IPIC/CE/IV/15 November 16, 1988 (assuming that this Treaty is not agreed upon at the forthcoming Diplo-
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(6) An agreement on the minimum undertaking a country must make
to secure the "adequate and effective" enforcement of intellectual property laws, both at the border and internally.3 '
The most politically volatile issue included in the negotiations appears
to be the extension of patent protection for pharmaceutical products.
Many developing countries consider this issue one of health policy and
technology transfer. Developed countries, however, believe the issue is of
paramount financial importance due to the dollar volume of lost sales
resulting from the exclusion of human drugs from patent protection.
The United States business community also seeks to obtain a new,
improved GATT dispute resolution mechanism. 2 Unlike the multilateral conventions administered by WIPO-which do not contain any effective enforcement mechanisms-the GATT can measure a nation's
laws" against a GATT code and, in effect, request changes upon finding
an inconsistency with the GATT. The existing GATT process is not
without flaws. Current practice provides no certainty that a panel will be
established to review a complaint. More significantly, once a panel reviews a matter, its decision is not binding unless agreed to by the GATT
council, which includes the parties to the dispute.
Already tentatively agreed to in Montreal were changes in the GATT
dispute resolution process that would guarantee a contracting party the
right to invoke the panel process and strict time deadlines. Yet to be
secured is a change in the dispute resolution process such that when the
GATT council reviews the results of GATT panel decisions, a party to
the dispute cannot block adoption of the report. The European Community has most frequently used this blocking technique, but the United
States has occasionally invoked it as well. Without a meaningful change
in the existing panel report approval process-which maximizes the po-

matic Conference scheduled for Washington, D.C. in May of 1989).

31. U.S. Submission, supra note 18.
32. On a general level, the goal is improvements in the operation of article XXIII of
the GATT. A separate code on intellectual property within the GATT system is also
desirable to this community. Such a code will include its own dispute resolution mechanism, perhaps tracking the article XXIII rules. Only the signatories of the intellectual
property code would be involved in this dispute resolution process.

33. The GATT actually requires an assessment of measures. This tradition appears
to have been ignored in the recent section 337 case where the panel, in assessing a case
that is technically moot, examined the nature of the law, rather than the impact of a
given measure on a set of goods. A panel, however, cannot alter GATT practice. Only
the GATT Council can give a report status by adopting it. Even if a panel report did
assess a law rather than measure, and such a decision was affirmed by the GATT Council, another future panel would not be bound by that interpretation.
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litical nature of the GATT dispute resolution process-the legal effect of
a finding of GATT inconsistency will be largely meaningless. 4
The key to a strong international intellectual property system within
the GATT is the ability to secure improvements in the laws of nations
that are parties to an intellectual property agreement through the use of
a strong dispute resolution mechanism. The use of binding dispute resolution, however, can cut both ways. If the United States is willing to
further expose its national trade instruments (such as section 301 of the
Trade Act) or border enforcement rheasures (such as section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930) to critical analysis and bind itself to alter its law in
light of an adverse decision by a GATT panel, then many domestic interests that benefit from these laws may force re-examination of the
United States GATT negotiating position.
B.

Risks to American Business Interests

How much is at risk for American interests in the Uruguay Round of
negotiations? There are at least two ways to answer this question. From
a domestic law perspective, we must compare our intellectual property

34. Bliss, GA7T Dispute Settlement Reform in the Uruguay Round: Problems and
Prospects,23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31 (1987); Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute
Settlement Under the GATT and the Tokyo Round Agreements: Report to the Senate
Comm. on Finance and Investigation No. 333-212 Under Section 332(g) of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (ITC 1985) (ITC Pub. No. 1793). For a discussion of the European view of
the GATT as a forum for negotiation, see Phan van Phi, A European View of the
GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. L. 150, 151 (1986).
Many serious conceptual and practical difficulties with respect to enforcement of intellectual property rights have not yet been addressed. First, the GATT offers protection to
goods, and rights can only be enforced by ContractingParties, that is, the nations that
exported the goods. Intellectual property rights are created under a national law and are
vested in an individual or other juridical entity. Intellectual property rights are also usually enforced by the private parties involved in the infringement dispute. To reconcile
this difference in approach, fashioning a new enforcement mechanism would be necessary. One possible solution of this problem would be to alter the GATT system to permit
Contracting Parties-but not private parties-to assert national rights in goods protected
by the national law of the state in which the intellectual property right first attaches,
rather than the country of origin. Other solutions may also emerge in the negotiations
process.
The second, and more difficult, practical problem with the approach set forth above is
that a good could be created in one nation, produced in another country, and shipped to
a third nation where the intellectual property norms were insufficient. In these cases it is
unclear why only the first nation would have GATT intellectual property rights and not
the second. There also may be some inconsistencies concerning a Contracting Party who
can assert rights in a tariff context (based on "country of origin") when a different Contracting Party may have those rights in an intellectual property dispute.
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laws and enforcement measures with the proposals from the other negotiating countries."5 Care should be taken that the negotiations do not
produce an agreement requiring changes in domestic law that will significantly alter the public interest.3" From an international intellectual
property perspective, the strength and vitality of existing multilateral organizations such as GATT and WIPO could be seriously eroded if the
negotiations fail.
The clearest examples of laws that the United States may be pressed
to change as a result of these negotiations are those in which it does not
provide the minimum protection our trading partners think necessary."
For example, the Europeans argue that we need to fashion a new, sui
generis design law. They also assert that the United States should amend
its trademark law to expand protection for both famous trademarks and
provide protection for appellations of geographic origin. To harmonize
its patent laws with those of Western Europe and Japan, the United
States would also have to adopt major changes in the existing law, including a 20 year patent term from date of filing and deleting authority
to patent sexually reproduced plants. Adoption of the European view of
copyright might require extending performance rights to sound recordings or adopting an explicit federal statute on moral rights of authors.38
Finally, a harmonized system of minimum intellectual property standards may require enactment of a federal trade secret statute. Notwithstanding the exclusion of the patenting of plants and the expansion of
35. Interestingly, the private sector in Europe, Japan, and the United States have
urged their governments to adopt a position that would not require amendments to the
laws of this community of interests. Basic Framework, supra note 25.
36. The President has been explicitly granted generalfast track authority, Trade Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 1984 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2115),
specifically for the GATT Round under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1101-03, 102 Stat. 1107, 1121-32. Essentially, fast track
means that the executive and legislative branches fully coordinate the position of the
United States during the negotiations. The formal experience with the fast track negotiating authority has only generally involved the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee; thus, it will be necessary to make some adjustments now
that other committees of the Congress are more formally involved in the consultation
process. Id. § 161. It may also be desirable to involve parties outside the traditional
Advisory Committees on Trade Negotiations (appointed by USTR and Commerce) in
the consultation process.
37. The United States approach has been to minimize the extent to which the laws
of the United States would have to be amended. Thus, the items listed in the text are a
(4worst case" scenario.
38. The Register of Copyrights has raised the possibility of other GATT contracting
parties' complaining about the lack of video rental rights under United States copyright
law. Oman Albany, supra note 9, at 8-12.
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moral rights for authors, these changes would serve to further the interests of intellectual property owners.
The second area of domestic law that could require amendment is our
most effective border enforcement measure: section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930.3' The European Community, Japan, Canada, and South Korea
all joined in a GATT complaint against section 337,40 asserting that its

failure to provide identical procedures and standards for the enforcement
of patent rights for domestic and foreign-produced goods violates the
GATT. The overwhelmingly negative nature of the concerns expressed
by these important trading partners-and their strategic importance in
this GATT round-makes modification of section 337 a distinct possibility. This is especially true in light of the fact that the GATT council is
currently reviewing 4 ' a finding by a GATT panel that section 337 is
inconsistent with the GATT.
A dramatic increase in the reliance on bilateral action may pose a real
short-term and, perhaps, long-term risk if the United States fails to secure improved intellectual property protection in the GATT. A cornerstone of world intellectual property protection is multilateralism based
on a concept of national treatment. The continued vitality of such an
approach may be at risk if the GATT negotiations fail.42 The most
likely proof that a multilateral approach is failing may be seen in the
United States frequent use of trade sanctions, under either section 301 or
through the denial of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits,
against countries who refuse to improve their intellectual property stan-

39. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
40. See supra note 21.
41. EC Endorses Panel's Ruling that § 337 Violates GATT Non-Discrimination
Rules, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 302 (1989).
42. An example of another problem with bilateral negotiations is the possibility that
one nation will secure advantages in the intellectual property laws of another nation that
do not apply to other nations. There has already been concern expressed about the failure of the United States negotiations with South Korea to extend similar benefits to other
nations such as Switzerland.
On the other hand, the use of bilateral pressure to secure intellectual property protection has shown some success in the context of semiconductor chips. Under section 914 of
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, the United States will only extend protection to nations that have been willing to undertake a process leading to the enactment
of a law similar in the degree of protection afforded to the law of the United States,
Protection of Semiconductor Chip Products, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (Supp. V 1987)). This approach has resulted in the enactment of
foreign laws. Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 417, 461-65 (1985).
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dards.4 3 Many trade specialists view this type of unilateral retaliation as
antithetical to the multilateral trade system because it creates a significant risk of similar unilateral action against the United States.""
One final concern with the United States Government position is
whether it is balanced. One inherent difficulty in making this assessment
is that it must be made by the executive branch. No matter how much
consultation occurs with the private sector and the Congress, the negotiating process is ultimately opaque to these interests. The final product of
any negotiations will be evaluated by the Congress on a take it or leave it
basis, making the dispassionate evaluation of smaller pieces of the negotiation more difficult. This is likely even if each set of negotiations produces a separate code, since the agreements are likely to be bundled together. Moreover, there is no clearly established forum for the balancing
of sectorial interests, or even differences of opinion between committees
having relevant jurisdiction within the Congress: a final agreement that
furthers the interests of agriculture may or may not enhance intellectual
property protection.
No matter how desirable changes in intellectual property laws are in

43. The list of countries to be targeted could be largely similar to the existing priorities because the United States Government has already attempted to put pressure on
some countries, such as Brazil and Thailand, through these mechanisms, to change their

intellectual property laws. PresidentReagan Imposes Sanctions on Brazilian Goods for
Patent Piracy, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 745 (1988). The Trade Act of
1984, as amended in 1988, already requires the executive branch to submit to Congress a
list of offending countries. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1303, 102 Stat. 1107, 1179-81.
44. The reliance on trade laws such as section 301 poses a separate set of problems
within the GATT process itself. Note, Opening Up Trade Barriers with Section
301-A CriticalAssessment, 5 Wis. INT'L L.J. 176, 200 (1986) (overuse of section 301
poses the greatest danger to United States GATT obligations). Some targets of such
actions have already complained that the use of section 301 itself violates the provisions
of the GATT. Brazil has obtained a panel to evaluate the consistency of section 301 with
the GATT. An overwhelming consensus existed in the GATT Council for the formation

of a panel. U.S. Agrees to GATT Panel to Study Brazilian PharmaceuticalSanctions,
37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 387 (1989). Trade retaliation in an effort to
change the internal policies of another Contracting Party of the GATT may violate the
unconditional most favored nation (MFN) on which GATT doctrine is based. State Department ProgramExamines "GATT and Intellectual Property," 31 Pat. Trademark
& Copyright J. (BNA) 497 (1986) (comments of Professor Robert Hudec); Trade-Based
Response, supra note 11, at 458. For a discussion of MFN and the GATT, see
Ehrenhaft, A U.S. View of the GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW L. 146, 147 (1986). If such
actions are seen to be GATT-inconsistent, further problems would arise. When the
United States argues that other countries should negotiate in good faith in a multilateral
forum in order to avoid unilateral actions, such an argument will be less credible if we
have already demonstrated our willingness to ignore our GATT obligations.
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the current GATT Round, some may suggest that failure to secure optimal results on intellectual property rights is not worth jeopardizing significant improvements that may be secured in the fields of agriculture
and services.45 More significantly, the failure to achieve significant advances in setting intellectual property standards should not serve as a
motive for diminishing the already unsteady support within the United
States for a multilateral, non-protectionist trade regime.
IV.

POLITICAL REALITY AND THE GATT/INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LINKAGE

During the next two years the GATT contracting parties will hold
further meetings at the working group level to discuss the inclusion of
intellectual property standards. The first sign of how far these talks are
likely to progress will come from the new Midterm Review scheduled for
Geneva in early 1989. These sessions will reveal whether the group led
by India and Brazil will continue to object to progress in this area. If
these countries alter their position, it may be possible to fashion a generally applicable set of international standards and enforcement measures
for intellectual property.
If the Indian/Brazilian faction maintains its current position, however, the developed countries will likely seek to establish a set of intellectual property standards on their own. This group, led by the United
States, the European Community, and Japan-and perhaps including
Switzerland, the Nordic countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Hong Kong, and some of the ASEAN nations-could move relatively
rapidly to adopt a high-level set of norms. These countries' legal systems
and extent of protection, combined with their relative level of development, would facilitate agreement. The evolution of a set of standards
that includes only thirty countries may present a problem for the .GATT
system, because it would undermine the need to integrate solutions to
various trade distorting practices into one common legal system with the
maximum possible number of participants. On the other hand, the previous GATT rounds have produced a series of agreements (for example,
government procurement, subsidies, and antidumping) that have included fewer than forty signatories.4 6 Thus, pre-existing precedents support a less than all-inclusive agreement."' Moreover, the inclusion of
45. The failure to incorporate intellectual property within the GATT does not eliminate the possibility that WIPO may be able to muster the political will to increase intellectual property standards or to develop enforcement standards.
46. Oman Albany, supra note 9, at 8-11.
47.

J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 2.
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most of the developed countries in an intellectual property code would
represent a substantial portion (approximately seventy-two percent) of
world trade in manufactured goods."8
Even without a GATT agreement on intellectual property, however,
some private sector interests believe that the mere fact of GATT negotiations will produce a more hospitable atmosphere for bargaining within
WIPO. Others believe that even the establishment of a set of standards
agreed to by only developed countries will be useful because it could
assist in establishing neutral criteria for use in the bilateral negotiation
process.
V.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

A significant challenge posed by the current GATT/Intellectual Property talks is the articulation of a coherent set of arguments about why
this exercise serves both the short-term and long-term interests of virtually all contracting parties. Intellectual property proponents have begun
to make a case for the economic benefits of enhanced intellectual property protection,49 but these assertions have not been accepted by the developing world. 50 The political reality for some developing nations may
48. UNITED NATIONS TRADE NET (computer data base, a part of a file within the
United Nations Trade Data System).
49. Speech by Denis Lamb, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department
of State, to the Second Indonesia-U.S. Conference on Economic and Business Relations,
Opportunities, Obstacles, Options, Intellectual Property Panel, 7 (January 22, 1987)
("[nlegative consequences for innovation [of copying] are clear ... even more insidious is
the long term effect that such practices can have on competitiveness by reducing potential
economies of scale and lowering returns"); see generally Hoffman, supra note 6, at 9-10.
Intellectual Property Committee, Briefing Book on Intellectual Propertyfor U.S. Private Sector Advisors to the Midterm Review of the Uruguay Round, Montreal, Canada,
Tab I (December, 1988). The IPC paper attempts to show that strong intellectual property laws will: (1) stimulate innovation, generate new products, create new jobs and
increase capital investment; (2) facilitate the transfer of technology; and (3) avoid permanent relegation to second class status as a "free rider" country.
M. GADBAW, supra note 14, at 1-22, 1-13. Gadbaw also points out that the likelihood
of change in the intellectual property context is the product of (1) the degree of pressure
exerted; (2) the importance of trade and investment relations with the developed world;
(3) the nature of the overall relationship to the developed world-including security issues; (4) the extent to which research and development activity is, or could be undertaken
within the country; and (5) the nation's economic development strategy. Id.
50. Candor compels a recognition that in the past, developed nations have been less
than fully protective of intellectual property rights. The United States, for example, was
during the 19th century a leading publisher of English works without extending copyright protection to those works. See generally B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON
COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND OTHER Topics BEARING ON THE PROTEC-
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be that local industries (such as pirates of software and records) deriving
significant income from the piracy of the research and development of
others are too strong to overcome. In other instances, the exclusion of
pharmaceutical products from patent protection may have resulted from
a conscious policy choice to lower drug prices. 1 Arguing that such a
policy will actually serve to limit the access the population has to the
latest and best medicines appears unavailing for this second group of
countries."2 Another form of incentive must be present before they will
be willing to strengthen their intellectual property laws. For some nations, there may be no realistic way to escape from lesser-developed status because of a lack of resources and population; these nations may have
no genuine hope of participating in a GATT code.
The United States may be able to secure a change in the position of
some developing nations on intellectual property issues by using the
threat or reality of trade sanctions under section 301.11 This tool is less
potent against larger developing countries that are less dependent on
trade with the United States; it may also be unavailable for use against

(Rev. Ed. 1978) (Part IV) (summarizes the denial of copyright protection by the United States and England during the
19th Century); see also Speech by Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights of the United
States, before Albany Law School Annual Conference on Intellectual Property, The
Growth of Internationalismin United States Copyright Policy," 1, 3 (1988) [hereinafter
Oman Albany II]. Similarly, the United States denigrated the importance of copyright by
maintaining the manufacturing clause for more than eighty years. Id. See also U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights,
and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Jud., 99th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 119
(1986) (Testimony of Patent and Trademark Commissioner Donald J. Quigg) (quoting
the remarks of Senator Chace in 1884 that the United States is "the Barbary Coast of
literature and the people of the United States ... the buccaneers of books").
For a discussion of a "weak" patent law in the evolution of Japan's economy, see
Note, The Role of the Patent System in Technology Transfer: The Japanese Experience,
26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131, 165 (1987) ("[T]he Japanese policy of tolerating the
copying of imports appears to have benefitted their economy in the early period of development without producing long-term negative effects.").
51. M. GADBAW, supra note 14, at 1-2.
52. Even the recitation of the positive experience of Italy and Korea when they
moved to protect product patents for pharmaceutical products may be unavailing, because
some other nations may not have the personnel to move from the technology of piracy to
that of research and development. Id. at 1-17.
53. Developing countries appear interested in requiring the use of multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms before resort can be had to unilateral national trade law
sanctions. In this regard there may be a similarity with the views of the European Community and Japan. See supra note 21.
TION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS
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others because of political or military concerns.5 4 Alternatively, the
United States and its allies on this issue might be able to structure an
arrangement on tropical products, agriculture, or services that provides
an incentive to developing countries to facilitate agreement on intellectual
property. In the event that these scenarios do not play out, other options
should be explored. Possible suggestions for change in the multilateral
trade environment, taking into account the developmental differences of
some lesser developed nations, might include:
(1) Development of a registration and enforcement system (either on a
national, regional, or international level) through the use of user fees.
This system could be funded-if not exclusively-by creators and inventors from the developed world. For example, the United States could use
AID funds to establish a strong national patent and copyright system
within certain target countries.5 5 Registrants in the initial years would
be drawn mostly from the developed world.
(2) The private sector could alter its previously targeted overseas investment to countries that offer improved intellectual property protection.
Differentiating on this basis among developing countries already targeted
to receive capital investments may provide an incentive to some nations
to improve their intellectual property laws and practices. Surely the
amount of money at risk through the loss of revenues as a result of
piracy justifies a modest investment in future business development in a
Third World country. There are some examples of this commitment,
including-albeit in the context of a developed country-an agreement
in Canada by the pharmaceutical industry to increase its level of research and development expenditures to secure expanded patent protection for human pharmaceuticals. As a result of less formal processes, the
record industry has engaged in licensing arrangements in Malaysia and
Turkey with people who were pirates before the copyright law was
strengthened. An American book publisher reportedly has expressed interest in locating publishing facilities in East Asia based, in part, on the
nature and extent of the host country's protection against piracy. 6 Such
investment commitments would, of course, have to be informal and nongovernmental in nature.5 Further, any such commitment would have to
54. M. GADBAW, supra note 14.

55. OTA Report, supra note 10, at 252.
56. Speech By Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights of the United States, before
World Intellectual Property Organization and Indian Ministry of Human Resource Development, Sub-regional Workshop on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, The Economic Impact of the Protection of Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 8-9 (Nov. 26,
1986).
57. It may be possible to link the United States position on some loans or other
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be in proportion to the relative size of the market and the ability of the
local economy to provide the necessary labor.
(3) Establishment of a transition period of limited duration for developing countries to facilitate the enactment of strong intellectual property
laws. Because the creation of such standards tends to freeze a lower level
of protection into place, care should be exercised to avoid the adoption of
special and differential standards for developing countries. The transition provisions should offer both a carrot and a stick. The United
States-and other developed nations 5 8-could offer to withhold unilateral trade sanctions pending satisfactory progress towards an agreedupon goal.59 In some instances, other positive trade benefits could be extended to countries making satisfactory progress."
There should also be a strong sanction, however, for noncompliance.
For example, expedited consideration of compliance with an intellectual
property code by a surveillance body, followed by mandatory sanctions,
could serve as an effective deterrent. For such an enforcement mechanism to be effective, the United States must secure changes in the GATT
dispute resolution process applicable to an intellectual property code to
guarantee that a panel decision will be implemented over the objection of
the losing party."1

financial guarantees within the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund to the
status of intellectual property protection, but any such initiative would require a careful
assessment of the competing United States geopolitical interests before it could be
undertaken,
58. M. GADBAW, supra note 14 at 1-19, 1-20.
59. Authority for the USTR to take into account a Contracting Parties' role in international negotiations already exists. See Determinations by Trade Representative, Pub.
L. 100-418 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(B)). H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 579 (1988).
60. Apparently Singapore and Hong Kong were the beneficiaries of extended benefits for a period of time. M. GADBAW, supra note 14, at 1-7, 1-23. However, GSP
benefits were withdrawn after Singapore changed its law. This withdrawal, although
undertaken for different policy reasons, effectively undercut the potential effect of the
GSP sanction. Other countries threatened with GSP withdrawal will be leery about
changing their domestic laws, unless they can receive a credible assurance that such
changes will secure a continuation of GSP benefits.
Some observers may view these undertakings as inconistent with the MFN obligations
of the GATT.
61. It is in the long-term best interest of the United States to have a strong dispute
resolution system within the GATT. This is so even though the United States has lost
important cases in the GATT, and despite the fact that we have blocked the adoption of
some panel reports. The stronger the world legal dispute resolution system, the more
likely that resort will be made to it, rather than to unilateral retaliatory actions. Bliss,
supra note 34, at 38-45. ITC Review, supra note 34.
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These three points are only tentative suggestions. More thoughtful
suggestions might emerge from the continuing discussions among the
contracting parties.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The inclusion of intellectual property in the GATT is an audacious
move by the developed countries. It represents a concrete opportunity for
the improvement of the international trading system. The development
within GATT of norms and standards for intellectual property is a process fraught with substantive and political difficulties. Despite these
risks, the United States should continue this initiative with renewed
vigor. If the United States hopes to expand intellectual property standards and norms to include developing countries, new perspectives need
to be considered in negotiating with the developing world. Initiatives
must be implemented for: (1) creative financing for the development of
intellectual property registration and enforcement; (2) investment commitments in the developing world by developed world private sector concerns; and (3) special transition rules for developing countries.
A significant risk of any negotiating process is that the process takes
on a life of its own, and that achievement of a settlement may be sought
without regard to balanced content. Criteria for measuring the success of
intellectual property negotiations should be articulated before the negotiations are completed. These standards should be established and understood by the Congress and the executive branch before the United States
sets forth its negotiating positions.6 2 Such standards include:
(1) The end product of the GATT negotiations should be balanced
within each major negotiating objective. Thus, any agreement on agriculture, services, or intellectual property should be able to stand on its own.
This does not mean that the total agreement should not be evaluated.
Rather, it signifies that the process should not permit different United
States interests to be set against each other. For example, an undesirable
result would be to secure valid intellectual property advances at the expense of the farm community.
(2) Changes in United States intellectual property law should conform
to the public interest test that Congress has traditionally used to evaluate

62. For an excellent discussion of the role of Congress in the foreign trade context,
see Gorlin, Foreign Trade and the Constitution reprinted in CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY (1989) (forthcoming from the American Enterprise Institute). See also
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lesson of the IranContra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255 (1988).
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legislation.6 Therefore, any proposed extension of intellectual property
protection must be for a limited term and offer a sufficient incentive for
creators and inventors.
(3) A GATT intellectual property agreement should supplement, and
not replace, the functions of WIPO; to do otherwise would risk undercutting existing multilateral intellectual property treaties and the expertise of the WIPO staff.
(4) An agreement should not require changes in the functioning of
section 337 of the Tariff Act or section 301 of the Trade Act, unless the
transparent, permanent benefits obtained through the negotiations clearly
outweigh proposed changes in current law.
(5) The level of intellectual property standards must not be less than
those of the Berne Convention in copyright or the proposed WIPO
Treaty with respect to semiconductor chips. Sound recordings should be
afforded adequate protection, either under copyright or neighboring
rights. Computer software should receive adequate protection either as
literary work or as a separate category of work under copyright that
offers a similar scope of protection, albeit for a shorter term.
(6) Chemicals, pharmaceutical products, and micro-organisms as patentable subject matter should be a minimum. Compulsory licenses and
working requirements should be avoided, unless they serve a compelling
public policy purpose, such as a violation of antitrust laws or protection
of national security.
(7) Border and internal enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property protection should be adequate in light of the legal traditions of the
nation involved. Although it is unrealistic to expect every country to
adopt our enforcement scheme, the effective denial of rights through
meaningless enforcement mechanisms should be deterred.
(8) A GATT agreement should not adopt special and differential
standards for developing countries with respect to intellectual property
standards. Transition rules for individual nations should be encouraged,
and incentives created to spur developing nations to graduate to GATT
norms and standards.
(9) An equitable mechanism for funding the enforcement of intellectual property standards and norms that recognizes the financial differences between the contracting parties should be developed.
Anticipating probable negotiating issues and the development of a political consensus within the United States Government before the Uruguay Round proceeds further is an important ingredient for success. Use

63.

See, e.g., Kastenmeier & Reimington, supra note 42, at 314.
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of the United States initial proposal as a bottom line negotiating position
is not sufficiently flexible and cannot last very long. This process must
take into account both domestic political concerns and the practical reality of international politics. With a realistic political agenda, this round
of GATT talks can succeed in promoting world-wide enhanced intellectual property protection.

